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Abstract. An analytically tractable approximation of a numerical model is used to investigate
coalition formation between nine major world regions with regard to their policies for greenhouse
gas emission reduction. Full cooperation is not individually rational. Assuming non-transferable
utility, side payments do not ensure full cooperation either. Without side payments, the largest stable
coalitions are small and consist of similar regions. With side payments, the largest stable coalitions
exclude either the main culprits or the main victims of climate change. In all cases, optimal emission
control is modest.
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1. Introduction
Climate change is a complex problem. For a proper understanding (hopefully lead-
ing to informed decisions), complicated models need to be build. There is lttle
special about that, were it not that the cause-effect chain of climate change crosses
the terrains of many disciplines, including physics, chemistry, ecology, economics,
and political science. An analysis of climate change thus combines, perhaps even
integrates the scientific traditions of various academic disciplines. Models support-
ing such analyses face a similar challenge. A number of individuals and groups
have taken up this challenge and started building what are now known as integrated
assessment mdoels of climate change. These models link together relevant ‘disci-
plinary models’. There are numerous ways of doing this, and about 25 different
models have emerged. Integrated assessment models come in sorts, however. The
survey in Chapter 10 of the Second Assessment Report of Working Group III of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Weyant et al., 1996) distinguishes
two main groups: policy optimisation and policy evaluation models. The evaluation
modellers take a policy proposal, run it through their system, and evaluate what
comes out. The optimisation modellers do the same, but also rank the outcomes,
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and select the policy that is best (the definition of which is model-dependent and
disputed). Optimisation is only possible by sacrificing model detail to increasing
computational speed. Optimisation IAMs sacrifice lots of detail, but still need to
be solved numerically. This allows one to analyse only a limited number of cases,
particularly the more straightforward ones. Moreover, although the behaviour of
the disciplinary components of the model is well-known, the behaviour of the
coupled system is little understood.
This paper attempts to contribute a little to both problems. I try to derive an un-
derstanding of the interactions between the optimal emission reduction policies of
(groups of) nations. I use this understanding to analyse the formation of coalitions
between regions. The literature on optimal emission reduction is, so far, restricted
to non-cooperative and fully cooperative policies (Escapa and Gutierrez, 1997;
Eykmans et al., 1993; Fankhauser and Kverndokk, 1996; Hoel, 1994; Nordhaus
and Yang, 1996; Peck and Teisberg, 1999). The literature on coalition formation
in the context of climate change and other international environmental issues is,
so far, restricted to analytical reasoning (Barrett, 1990, 1994; Bottean and Carraro,
1997; Carraro and Moricone, 1997; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992, 1993; Chander
and Tulkens, 1992; Chen, 1997), without much ‘empirical’ input. This paper tries
to combine these strands of literature. The paper focuses on a policy optimisation
integrated assessment model of climate change called the Climate Framework for
Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND), Version 1.5 (Tol, 1997a,b).
This paper follows this route. In Section 2, an analytically tractable approxima-
tion (linear-quadratic) of FUND is derived. This is used in Section 3 to look at the
formation of coalitions bewteen the nine players involved. Section 4 extends this
by allowing for all interregional capital transfers, which is not trivial as utility is
non-transferable in FUND. Section 5 concludes.
2. An Analytical Approximation to FUND
Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND), Ver-
sion 1.5, is in many respects an ordinary integrated assessment model of climate
change. It captures the full cycle from population, to economic activity, to emis-
sions, to changes in the atmospheric composition, to climate change, to its impacts,
and then back to population and economy. FUND 1.5 also includes the effects of
greenhouse gas emission reduction on conventional air pollution. Other integrated
assessment models typically ignore these so-called secondary benefits. FUND cov-
ers the period 1990–2200 in time steps of one year. It distinguishes nine regions:
OECD-America (OECD-A), OECD-Europe (OECD-E), OECD-Pacific (OECD-
P), Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (CEE&fSU), Middle
East (ME), Latin America (LA), South and Southeast Asia (S&SEA), Centrally
Planned Asia (CPA) and Africa (AFR). All component modules are simple and
calibrated to reflect state-of-the-art knowledge. The overall behavior of the model
mimics the consensus of the literature. The aim of the model is to calculate emis-
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Table I. Costs and benefits of CO2 emission reduction.
Region Primarya Secondaryb 1% red.c 10% red.d
OECD-America 1.5 15.00 0.02 0.76
OECD-Europe 1.6 11.18 0.04 0.77
OECD-Pacific 3.8 4.02 0.06 0.97
Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union –0.4 9.46 0.02 1.63
Middle East 5.5 0.56 0.01 0.60
Latin America 3.1 1.69 0.12 12.03
South and Southeast Asia 5.3 2.23 0.04 3.85
Centrally Planned Asia –0.1 4.01 0.01 0.56
Africa 6.9 0.99 0.01 0.60
a Monetized impact (as percent of GDP) of a doubling of the atmospheric concentration
of carbon dioxide on the current economy.
b Marginal benefits (as $/tC) of greenhouse gas emission reduction on conventional air
pollution.
c Total costs (as per cent of GDP) of a one per cent cut in carbon dioxide emissions.
d Total costs (as per cent of GDP) of a ten per cent cut in carbon dioxide emissions.
sion reduction strategies that balance the impact of climate change and the impact
of emission abatement. To that end, all impacts of climate change and conventional
air pollution are expressed in their monetary equivalents and, together with the
costs of emission abatement, used to correct consumption and investment. Regional
welfare is defined as the natural logarithm of per capita consumption minus per
capita monetized, intangible damage of climate change and air pollution. Per capita
consumption reflects the costs of emission reduction and the monetized, tangible
damages of climate change and air pollution. FUND, Version 1.5, is presented
in greater detail in Tol (1997a, b), and in the appendix. Some key parameters are
displayed in Table I.
Impacts of emission reduction and climate change are balanced by max-
imising net present welfare. In the full model, this can be done both with full
cooperation, and without any cooperation between the nine regions. Below, an ap-
proximate model is derived to study situations lying between non-cooperation and
full cooperation. Non-cooperative optimal emission reduction equals the standard
Nash-Cournot case, that is, each region maximises its net welfare, knowing the
optimal emission reductions of the other regions. Non-cooperative optimal emis-
sion reduction differs from the business-as-usual (or no climate policy) scenario
because the number of regions is only 9 (see Nordhaus and Yang, 1996, for a non-
cooperative game with many more players). Cooperative optimal emission control
follows from maximising the joint welfare of all regions together.
FUND is implemented in TurboPascal 7.0 for DOS. A third-generation lan-
guage allows more flexibility than a fourth-generation one, such as GAMS.
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Flexibility is needed if one is interested in performing simulation, optimisation,
game-theoretic, and uncertainty analyses with the same model.
The optimisation algorithm is specific to FUND. The model is structured in
such a way that there is a single optimum for both the cooperative and the non-
cooperative case. In the cooperative case, the optimum is found by the method of
steepest descent. Starting from zero emission reduction for all regions, emissions
are reduced for that region that most increases global welfare. This is repeated until
a maximum is reached. This process is repeated with decreasing step-size.
The non-cooperative case is slightly more involved. In the first iteration, given
zero emission reduction for all other regions, optimal emission reduction is found
for each region. Knowing that there is a single optimum, this is readily found by
walking there with decreasing step-size. The optimal emission reductions of the
first iteration are assumed for the other regions in the second iteration. This is
repeated until the nth and (n+ 1)th iteration yield the same answer; typically, n is
small (5 or 6).
The structure of the FUND model differs from that of the other policy optimisa-
tion integrated assessment models of climate change. Opposed to what is common
in this type of model, the accumulation of capital is not driven by optimisation, but
based on an exogenous scenario. Experimentation with other IAMs, particularly
Nordhaus’s DICE, revealed that investments are hardly affected by climate change
or emission reduction policies.1 At the same time, calculating optimal investments
requires time-consuming optimisation even for the no-intervention, business-as-
usual scenario. FUND does not require that. It does not optimise but assumes
investments.
A second difference is that FUND does not explicitly calculate the optimal
emission reduction in each period of time. Rather, future emission reduction fol-
lows from the optimal reduction in the decade 1990–2000. Tol (1997a) shows that
a fixed trajectory of emission reduction, varying only in its starting point, is a
good approximation for a full intertemporal optimisation. The optimal trajectory is
smooth and not very steep. There are two reasons for this. First, the energy module
of FUND is very simple and indeed smooth. Second, the impacts of climate change
depend more on the rate of climate change than on its level (cf. Tol, 1996).
Thus, per region, emission reduction policy can be described with a single
number. Emission reduction can be set at any level – if the model is used in its
simulation mode – or it can be set so as to maximise net present welfare – if the
model is used in its optimisation mode.
These are the two crucial differences of FUND: it can evaluate policies without
optimisation, and it can describe a policy with a single number. These features
serve a goal. Optimisation requires that there is a single indicator to distinguish a
good from a bad policy. This indicator is the net present welfare of a region. One
is then interested in the mapping of the indicator that describes the policy to the
indicator that evaluates the policy. Since FUND can run many scenarios in a short
time, it is possible to visualise this mapping, even for the interactions between its
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Figure 1. Net present welfare of OECD-America as a function of its emission reduction, with
random variation of the other regions’ emission control.
nine regions. Furthermore, this mapping can be captured with well-behaved analyt-
ical functions, so that the unwieldy numerical model has an analytically tractable
counterpart.
The analytical approximation of FUND is derived in the following way. First,
optimal cooperative and non-cooperative emission trajectories are calculated with
the full model (cf. Tol, 1997a, b). Second, 1000 random emission abatement poli-
cies are evaluated. The random policies are selected from intervals encompassing
the optimal reductions under cooperation and non-cooperation. Action and welfare
indicators are saved and, in the third step, loaded into a statistical software pack-
age. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between emission reduction and welfare for
OECD-America. There is clearly an optimum. The noise around what appears to
be a smooth curve is the influence of the other regions’ actions on the welfare of
OECD-America. This noise is not large because OECD-America is little vulnerable
to climate change (which is the only interaction between regions). Figure 2 dis-
plays the same relationship for Africa, which is muchj more vulnerable to climate
change; consequently, its welfare is far more dependent on other regions’ actions.
Wj = αj +
∑
i
βj,iRi + γjR2j (1)
where W denotes net present welfare, R emission reduction, and j en i indicate
the nine regions. Equation (1) explains more than 99.9% of the variations in welfare
in all regions (cf. Table II) – this is so high because the number of observations is
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Figure 2. Net present welfare of Africa as a function of its emission reduction, with random
variation of the other regions’ emission control.
1000. Note that (1) is not a reaction curve; instead, (1) gives regional welfare as a
function of emission reduction in each region.
The fourth step calculates optimal emission reductions. Equation (1) is a very
convenient form, in fact, it is a linear-quadratic (LQ) game. The optimal solution
without cooperation is simply −βjj /2/γj , which is a maximum if γ < 0. To a first
approximation, there is no interaction between the regions. The non-cooperative
solution of the analytical approximation is indistinguishable from the numberical
solution fo the full model (cf. Table III). Cooperation between regions can be prof-
itable if region j does a little more for the benefit of region i and viceversa. The
optimal reduction of region j , cooperating with region i, is −(βjj + βij )/2/γj ,
where βij is the influence of region j ’s emission reduction on region i’s welfare. If
region k joins the coalition, region j changes its emission reduction by −βkj /2/γj ,
and so on for other regions joining. The fully cooperative solution of the analytical
approximation again closely correspond to the numerical solution of the full model
(cf. Table III). Since the LQ approximation is satisfactory for the cooperative and
non-cooperative scenarios, it is assumed that the approximation is acceptable for
all other possible coalitions as well.
3. Coalitions in FUND
Table II displays the βs and the γ s of Equation (1). Interestingly, the βs and
have mixed signs. Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and
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Table III. Cooperative and non-cooperative optimal emission reductiona according to
the full model, FUND1.5, and its approximation, Equation (1).
Region Non-cooperative Cooperative
Full modelc Approximation Full modelc Approximation
OECD-A 0.0700 0.0666 0.1000 0.0966
OECD-E 0.0300 0.0306 0.0700 0.0666
OECD-P 0.0300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CEE&fSU 0.0500 0.0509 0.0700 0.0687
ME 0.2500 0.2524 0.2600 0.2631
LA 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0033
S&SEA 0.0200 0.0164 0.0200 0.0182
CPA 0.5300 0.5264 0.5800 0.5788
AFR 0.0700 0.0711 0.0800 0.0850
a Percent emission reduction from the current baseline emissions.
b In the non-cooperative optimum, regions maximise regional net present welfare
knowing the other regions optimal emission reduction. In the cooperative optimum,
the sum of regional welfare is maximised.
c The numerical optimum is found with an accuracy of two digits, i.e., a hundredth of
a percent.
Source: Tol (1997b) and own calculations.
Centrally Planned Asia do approve of other regions abating emissions. The reason
is that these regions (are assumed to) benefit from climate change (Fankhauser,
1995; Tol, 1995). They do reduce their own emissions due to conventional air pol-
lution. Some other βs are negative too. This is probably a statistical fluke, despite
the high significance of the parameter estimates OECD-Pacific is the only region
which seeks to increase its emissions. Emissions are capped with business-as-usual
emissions.
As the optimal control for each possible coalition is now known in closed form,
the entire coalition space can be searched in a relatively straightforward manner.
Consider first the case without interregional side payments. All coalitions, starting
with the largest, are analysed as to whether their members have an incentive to
leave, that is, whether a region can increase its welfare by acting on its own. It
appears that only a few, small coalitions are internally stable.2 Note that, since the
search starts with the full coalition, the largest coalitions are externally stable as
well, that is, no other region would seek to join the coalition. Note also that, in an
LQ-game, the stability of the coalition is unaffected by the question of whether or
not the non-members cooperate with each other.3 The total number of internally
stable coalitions is 8, the largest coalitions have 3 members. The internally stable
coalitions are:
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{OECD-P, LA, S&SEA}
{OECD-E, CEE&fSU, CPA}
{OECD-A, CEE&fSU, CPA}
• {OECD-A, OECD-E}
{OECD-E, CPA}
• {CEE&fSU, CPA}
• {ME, AFR}
• {LA, S&SEA}
The coalitions in italics are the ones that together uniquely form the bargaining
set, nucleolus and kernel (cf. Friedman, 1991, for definitions). That is, OECD-
America and OECD-Europe prefer to be together rather than with the (former)
Communist countries. Latin America and South and Southeast Asia are better off
without OECD-Pacific. The expected outcome of international negotiations thus
entails four small coalitions and one atom. Barrett (1990, 1994), Carraro (1998),
Carraro and Moricone (1997), Carraro and Siniscalco (1992, 1993), Chen (1997),
Eyckmans et al. (1993), Hoel (1994), Nordhaus and Yang (1996), and Tol (1997,
1999a,b) established earlier that the grand coalition is unstable. Based on analytical
reasoning, Barrett and Carraro argued earlier that a number of smaller coalitions
may be stable.
The stability of coalitions depends in a non-trivial and ambiguous manner on
the parameterization of the underlying model. For instance, consider the case in
which player j decides whether or not to cooperate with player k. The change in
welfare of player j is:
Wj = βkj2
(
βkj
2γj
− βjk
γk
)
. (2)
All four parameters in (2) would change if the parameterization of the model
changes. It is therefore impossible to say a priori what the impact on the stability
of coalitions would be. Elaborate re-estimation of (1) is the only way out.
If the climate sensitivity is doubled from 2.5 ◦C temperature increase for a dou-
bling of the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide to 5 ◦C, the number of
stable coalitions declines. There is more at stake, and so potential coalition part-
ners are better scrutinised. The kernel (etc.) remains largely the same, although the
cooperation between Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and
Centrally Planned Asia breaks up. The internally stable coalitions are in this case:
{OECD-P, LA, S&SEA}
• {OECD-A, OECD-E}
• {ME, AFR}
• {LA, S&SEA}
If the climate sensitivity is halved to 1.25 ◦C for doubled CO2, the number of
internally stable coalitions increases:
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{OECD-A, OECD-E, CEEE&fSU, CPA}
{OECD-A, OECD-P, CEEE&fSU, CPA}
{OECD-E, OECD-P, CEEE&fSU, CPA}
{OECD-A, OECD-E, CPA}
{OECD-P, CEEE&fSU, CPA}
{OECD-P, LA, C&SEA}
• {OECD-A, OECD-E}
{OECD-A, CEEE&fSU}
{OECD-A, CPA}
{OECD-E, CEEE&fSU}
{OECD-E, CPA}
• {CEE&fSU, CPA}
• {ME, AFR}
• {LA, S&SEA}
The kernel (etc.) remains the same. Centrally Planned Asia prefers a coalition with
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union over one with OECD-
America and/or OECD-Europe. The (former) Communists prefer to be together
rather than sticking with two OECD regions.
In all three cases, similar regions tend to cluster together, the main similarity be-
ing the impacts of climate change. Centrally Planned Asia and Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union both benefit from climate change, OECD-
Europe and OECD-America are a little vulnerable, Latin America and South and
Southeast Asia are modestly vulnerable, and Africa and the Middle East are very
vulnerable to climate change. Increasing the odds, i.e., increasing the severity of
climate change, reduces the incentives of regions to cooperate.
4. Interregional Capital Transfers
In FUND, interregional capital transfers are not straightforward, FUND optimises
net present welfare, which is not-transferable. Capital can be transferred, but wel-
fare is non-linear in capital. For small transfers, the relationship between capital
transfers and welfare is:
K = Y1990(eW/188.6 − 1) , (3)
where K denotes the capital transfer, Y1990 GDP in 1990 and W the change in
welfare (cf. Tol, 1997a,b). The ‘one-size-fits-all’ nature of (3) comes about because
the regions have the same pure rate of time preference. Population and economic
growth rates differ, but this effect is exactly cancelled by the induced differences
in discount rates. Thus, changes in the net present welfare due to capital transfers
are determined by the pure rate of time preference (1%) and the time horizon (100
years) – 88.6 derives from this. The exponential comes about because welfare is
the natural logarithm of income.
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Figure 3. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide according to, from to bot-
tom, business-as-usual, full non-cooperation, kernel without side payments, kernel with side
payments, and full cooperation.
Because of the nonlinearity of Equation (3), a coalition that improves welfare
for the total of its members but not for each individual does not automatically
generate sufficient side payments for its sustenance. In this case, the poor, vulner-
able regions benefit most from cooperation. Their welfare gains, translated into
money, are not sufficient to convince the rich regions to emit less. A similar search
procedure is used: starting with the largest coalition, all coalitions are analysed as
to whether they can generate capital transfers to improve upon the kernel. The two
largest such coalitions occur in the following solutions:
• {OECD-A, OECD-E, OECD-P, CEE&fSU, ME, LA, CPA} {S&SEA} {AFR}
{OECD-A, OECD-E, OECD-P, CEE&fSU, ME, LA, S&SEA, CPA, AFR} ,
where the one in italics is preferred by all regions bar OECD-America and OECD-
Europe, which are compensated. Note that South and Southeast Asia and Africa
also prefer the coalition which excludes them. The outcome is the same with cli-
mate sensitivity doubled or halved. Interestingly, either the two most vulnerable
and pooresth regions (demanding most emission reduction while generating least
transfers) are excluded, or the two largest and richest regions (emitting most while
demanding high compensation for reductions). A similar grouping can be observed
in the case without capital transfers. In that case, the (former) Communist regions,
both benefiting from climate change, also cling together.
5. Conclusions
Figure 3 displays the trajectories of carbon dioxide concentrations in the at-
mosphere, for the business as usual, non-cooperative, kernel, capital transfer, and
full cooperative (note: unstable) solutions. Differences are small. This is accentu-
ated by Figure 4 which displays the corresponding global mean temperatures in
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Figure 4. The global mean surface air temperature in the year 2100 according to, from left to
right, business as usual, full non-cooperation, kernel without side payments, and kernel with
side payments.
2100. The main message of this exercise turns out to be methodological, rather
than policy-relevant. It is possible to use analytically tractable approximations
of numerical integrated assessment models to analyse coalition formation. Fully
cooperative welfare maximisation leads to modest greenhouse gas emission re-
duction. The global coalition is not stable, irrespective of the international side
payments. Smaller coalitions lead to lower emission reductions. Without side
payments, the largest stable coalitions are small (three regions) and consist of
regions with similar characteristics. With side payments, the largest stable coalition
excludes either the largest emitters or the most vulnerable regions.
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Notes
1 Kaufman (1997) reaches a similar conclusion. Note that CETA (Peck and Teisberg, 1991, 1999)
also uses this trick to speed up computations (Peck, personal communication, 1998).
2 I do not analyse the stability of the coalition with respect to more than one member leaving at
the same time. In the LQ-game, it does not matter whether members leave the coalition one at a time
or simultaneously. To the defectors, it does matter whether they cooperate with each other or not. If
stable, such sub-coalitions are identified in the search process.
3 Cf. Note 2.
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